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I. Introduction: Four Puzzles
There are four factors involved in the current financial crisis in Asia that have caused surprise. Since the Latin
American debt crisis was thought to have been aggravated by the dominance of syndicated private bank
lending, borrowers were encouraged to increase private direct investment flows. The stability of capital flows to
Asia was used as an example. Yet, the Asian crisis appears to have been precipitated by the reversal of
short-term private bank lending. 
Second, the flows of capital to Asia have been used as example of the benefits of free international capital
markets in directing resources to the most productive uses. Yet, in the aftermath of the crisis it appears that total
returns on equity investments in Asia have in fact been lower than in most other regions throughout the 1990s. 
Third, it appears that in a number of Asian countries, the majority of the international lending was between
foreign and domestic banks. It has been suggested that the major cause of the crisis is unsafe lending practices
by the Asian banks permitted by inadequate national prudential supervision. Yet, these economies were the
most advanced on the road to market liberalisation. One of the cardinal principles of financial liberalisation,
formed in the aftermath of the Chilean crisis, is that the creation of institutional structures ensuring the stability
of the financial system should precede financial market liberalisation. Indeed, many countries were following
this advice. It is interesting to note that the lending banks were generally large, global banks who employ
highly sophisticated risk assessment procedures. Yet, they appear to have continued lending well after the
increased risks in the region were generally apparent. This suggests that even the most sophisticated operators
in global financial markets have difficulties in assessing risk, and that their regulators were no more successful
in imposing prudent limits. 
Finally, private portfolio and direct investment flows were considered to be preferable to syndicated bank
lending because they were thought to segregate the problem of foreign exchange instability from asset market
instability. Syndicated lending was denominated in the currency of the lending bank, and the exchange rate risk
was borne by the borrower; but direct equity investors purchase foreign financial assets denominated in foreign
currency and thus bears the currency risk. It was suggested that in a crisis the foreign investor would suffer
first from a fall in asset prices, and second from a decline in the exchange rate, which would discourage him
from liquidating the investment and reduce selling pressure in the foreign exchange market. Yet, the linkage
between the collapse in exchange rates and equity markets appears to have been even closer in Asia than in
other experiences of financial crisis.
One explanation of the crisis in foreign exchange markets is that a large proportion of foreign borrowing by
corporates and banks was unhedged because of prevailing expectations of stable exchange rates. When these
expectations were disappointed, the scramble to repay these foreign currency loans created a massive market
imbalance and a collapse of the foreign exchanges. This absence of generalised hedging of foreign borrowing
has been interpreted to mean that financial derivative contracts played little or no role in the crisis. This position
has been reinforced by the repeated references to an IMF study which suggests that global hedge funds werenot active catalysts in the Asian crisis.1 However, the recent quarterly reports (for the 4th quarter of 1997 and
1st quarter of 1998) of US money-centre banks reflecting the initial impact of the Asian crisis on their lending
to the area suggest that most of their initial losses have been related to derivative-based credit swap contracts.
Thus, at least in the case of US banks, certain types of derivative contracts appear to have played some role in
the flows of funds to Asia and thus in the instability of these flows. While bank derivatives are
"tailored-to-the-client" "over-the-counter" contracts, and as such are not generally public knowledge, the
experience of such contracts in the Tequila crisis earlier in this decade provides some indication of the kinds of
contracts that might have been involved. This short note thus suggests ways in which bank derivative contracts
may have been linked to the rise in short-term bank lending to Asia and contributed to the four puzzles noted
above concerning capital flows to the region.
II. Structured Derivatives 
Most people are now familiar with standard derivative contracts used in hedging risk, such as forwards, futures
and options. While foreign-currency forwards remain the province of bank foreign exchange dealers, most
basic futures and options contracts are standardised and traded in organised, regulated markets. Banks also
offer derivative contracts to their clients in what is termed the "over-the-counter" (OTC) market. But, there is no
market involved in these contracts, which may involve the stipulation of standard futures and options contracts
outside of the organised market on a bilateral basis with individual clients. However, the majority of OTC
activity involves individually tailored, often highly complex, combinations of standard financial instruments
packaged together with derivative contracts designed to meet the particular needs of clients. These contract
packages involve very little direct lending by banks to clients, and thus generate little net interest income.
However, they have the advantage, given the necessity of meeting the Basle capital adequacy requirements, of
requiring little or no capital, or of being classified as off-balance sheet items because they do not represent a
direct risk exposure of bank funds. In addition, they generate substantial fee and commission income. Rather
than committing own capital, the banks serve in these transactions as intermediaries whose services involve not
only matching borrowers and lenders, but as market innovators creating investment vehicles that attract lenders
and borrowers. This activity often requires banks to accept some of the risks associated with the derivatives in
order to produce packages that permit them to intermediate between independent borrowers and lenders. These
derivative risks may or may not be hedged by the bank, depending on its own proprietary investment strategy.
When hedging does occur it can be done either by physical hedging (i.e. the actual purchase of an offsetting
position in the underlying financial asset), through the purchase of derivative contracts in organised markets, or
by producing a package which involves risks which offset those involved in other packages (cross hedging or
risk matching across clients). 
The major objective of the active global financial institutions is thus no longer the maximisation of profits by
seeking the lowest cost funds and channeling them to the highest risk-adjusted return, but rather in maximising
the amount of funds intermediated in order to maximise fees and commissions, thereby maximising the rate of
return on bank capital. This means a shift from continuous risk assessment and risk monitoring of funded
investment projects that produce recurring flows of interest payments over time, to the identification of riskless
"trades" that produce large, single payments, with all residual risks the responsibility of the purchasers of the
package. This process has been accelerated by the introduction of risk-weighted capital requirements. As a
result, banks have come to play a declining role in the process of the efficient international allocation of
investment funds. Rather, they serve to facilitate this process by linking primary lenders and final borrowers.
This means that the efficient allocation of funds to the highest risk-adjusted rate of return depends increasingly
on assessment of risks and returns by the lender. Yet, it is the role of most derivative packages to mask the
actual risk involved in investment, and to increase the difficulty in assessing the final return on funds
provided.2 As a result, certain types of derivatives may increase the difficulties faced by private capital markets
in effectuating the efficient allocation of resources. By extension, if they make investment evaluation more
difficult for primary lenders, they may also create difficulties for financial market regulators and supervisors.
These particular aspects can be most clearly seen by reference to structured credit derivative contracts that
expanded dramatically during the 1990s. Most US institutional investors do not face unlimited investment
choices. Standard limitations restrict investments to assets with a minimum of risk given by an "investment
grade" credit rating on the issue, and many also preclude certain types of risk, such as foreign exchange risks,
or foreign credit risk (these often are simply the result of the application of the investment grade restriction).This means that a large proportion of professionally managed institutional investment funds cannot be invested
in emerging markets or in particular asset classes such as foreign exchange. Structured derivative packages,
created by global investment banks, have often provided the means by which these restrictions could be
overcome.
Structured derivatives have been used in two ways. In 1992 and 1993, in a falling interest rate environment,
they provided a means to increase returns for money managers and then when rates started to rise to provide
borrowers with below market borrowing rates. They usually involved structured credit notes with imbedded
options. "These notes only carried a higher coupon because they contained an embedded short position in
interest rate options. In other words, often when an investor bought a structured note, he simultaneously sold
an interest rate option. ... There is no doubt that some less knowledgeable investors did not realize that by
buying these securities, they were selling options or engaging in leveraged bets, because some of these features
were quite cleverly concealed" (Chew, p. 54-5). The assumption behind such contracts is that the price of the
instrument underlying the contract would not change sufficiently to produce a loss that completely eliminated
the premium earned from selling the option. The famous Procter and Gamble and Gibson cases involved
contracts of precisely this type. The interest costs to the borrower were reduced by the amount of the option
premium gained from writing a put option on interest rates with a highly levered payoff profile.
An example closer to the present context might involve US government agency dollar denominated structured
notes with the interest payment, or the principal value, linked to an index representing some foreign asset. The
return to these notes would be higher than US domestic rates, but the increased yield would be accompanied by
the increased risk due to foreign exchange exposure. Such an asset might be a one-year dollar-denominated
note paying a guaranteed above-market interest rate, but with the amount of repayment of principal linked to an
index, say the Thai baht/dollar exchange rate. Since the asset is denominated in US dollars, and the interest is
guaranteed and paid in US dollars, the notes carry a top investment grade credit rating and would be carried on
the balance sheets of investors as the equivalent of a US Treasury bill, not as a foreign investment subject to
foreign exchange or country risks. Yet, the above market interest rate on the note is generated by the sale of a
put option on the Thai baht at a strike price just above the current market rate that is in fact imbedded in the
contract. This is equivalent to the buyer having purchased the Thai currency. If the baht remains constant, the
written put is not exercised and the option premium received is retained by the writer to augment the interest
rate. However, if the baht were to depreciate to a value below the strike price, then the buyer of the put will
exercise his right under the option to sell baht at a price higher than the market price. The writer of the option
incurs a loss determined by the difference between the strike price and the market price for baht. Since the
interest rate is guaranteed, the loss will not cause a reduction in the rate of interest. However, the margin over
the market interest rate and any loss on the option position will be recovered through a reduction in the amount
of principal returned at maturity. An investor seeking to maximise yield may be attracted by the guarantee on
the interest rate, and underestimate or even ignore the risk of loss in capital value. Since the writer of an option
has an unlimited exposure, a large change in the exchange rate could cause a total loss of capital invested. 
Alternatively, this contract could have been constructed by lending the principal (less the discounted value of
the guaranteed dollar interest payment which is invested in a one-year Treasury bill) directly to a Thai bank by
buying a bank acceptance. Again, the implicit assumption is that the baht/$ exchange rate should remain
constant so that the baht interest and principal repayment can be converted at maturity to a dollar value equal to
the original investment of principal. If the baht devalues relative to the dollar, then the amount available to repay
the principal will be lower. The buyer thus has the entire principal at risk, only the interest is guaranteed. The
contract arranged in this way would provide Thai banks with below market rate funds, provide US investors
with above market returns (US rates were in decline from 1991 to 1994) and the banks with fees and
commissions for arranging the trade, but with no commitment of capital (most US banks were emerging from
the experiences of the real estate crisis of the 1980s and were seeking to rebuild capital). 
It is virtually impossible for the US investor to evaluate the use of the funds made by the Thai bank, and there
is little incentive for the US bank to do so, since once the issue is sold, the foreign credit and foreign exchange
risks are borne by the US investor. The investor is not only subverting prudential controls (on its balance sheet
these assets would be classified as exposure to a US entity, with investment grade credit risk), but is in all
probability evaluating the return without any adjustment for the foreign exchange risk, even if that risk is
recognised as such. There is thus little economic interest or possibility for the market to either assess the riskor the returns of the investment.
III. Structured Credit Derivatives
Structured products also provided the basis for the growing market in credit derivative contracts. This was
usually via credit swaps embedded in structured notes to form credit-linked notes. The objective of a credit
swap is for the counterparties to exchange the credit risks associated with an instrument, while retaining the
cash flow characteristics. Total return swaps "enable counterparties to swap the total economic risk attached to
a reference asset without actually transferring the asset itself. ... Under the terms of the swap, [the first
counterparty] pays [the second counterparty] the cashflows generated by the reference asset, including coupon
payments and any appreciations in its capital valued calculated on a periodic mark to market basis. [The second
counterparty], in exchange, pays a LIBOR-linked margin plus any depreciations in the capital value of the
reference asset." (Ghose, p. 3). A credit swap or equity swap, thus transfers the credit risk, including the impact
of a credit event on the capital value of the asset. 
It was the creation of the Brady Bond that provided the recipe for the extension of many of these structured
loans to emerging markets. A Brady Bond is a variety of structured derivative package in which the developing
country (Mexico was the first) uses foreign exchange reserves as equity capital to create an investment
company. The investment company vehicle then uses the equity (i.e. the foreign exchange) to buy long-term,
stripped US Treasury bonds. The investment company also issues its own fixed interest liabilities in the form
of long-term bonds (which came to be called Brady Bonds after the US Secretary of the Treasury who held
office at the time), which carry a sovereign government guarantee, in an amount equal to the maturity value of
the US Treasury discount bonds. The investment vehicle's bonds are in fact only issued in exchange for the
debtor country's outstanding foreign bank debt at its current market value (in Mexico's case this represented a
discount to its face value of about 35%). The principal of the bonds issued by the investment vehicle (the
Brady Bonds) is thus guaranteed by the Treasury bonds held, and repayment in full at maturity is riskless.
Additional short-term Treasury coupon strips (which provide only payment of interest without principal) were
also purchased by the investment vehicle to provide a guarantee for the interest payments during the first 18 or
24 months of life of the bonds. After that, interest would have to be paid from the underlying loans or other
government sources. The interest is thus only partially guaranteed and only riskless for the payments backed
by the US Treasury strips. Banks that exchanged their loans to developing countries for these "Brady bonds"
could then trade them in the open market, with their values determined by changes in the issuing country's
sovereign credit rating and in US interest rates which affect the current value of the underlying collateral -- the
Treasury bonds. 
Although the maturities of the Brady bonds were usually 20 or more years, in the case of a Brady bond with a
two-year rolling interest guarantee, it was identical to buying a 20-year discount zero coupon bond, a six-month
zero bond, a 12-month zero, an 18-month zero, and a two-year zero. These streams were default-free, so they
could be considered as AAA. It was only the interest payments to be paid after the second year that (which
could be represented as 36 zero coupon bonds with maturities running from 30 months to twenty years at
six-month intervals) carried foreign exchange and sovereign credit risk. The Brady structure thus provided
complicated market valuation, it also provided an infinite number of possibilities for rearranging the various
pieces of the bond into more attractive cash flow structures.
"An example would be transferring Brady bonds into a trust structure, rearranging the cash flows and
swapping them from floating USD into fixed DEM with a bullet repayment. Investors are thus able to achieve
a higher yield than a Latin American DEM Eurobond with essentially the same counterparty risk. The bank
arranging the issue is left with a contingent default risk on the underlying Brady bonds. There can be a loss in
the case of a default, as the residual value of the Brady bonds in the trust might not be sufficient to cover the
bank's potential loss from unwinding the cross currency swap." (Watzinger, p. 49).
Thus, a company set up to buy Brady Bonds could issue its own two-year bonds that would carry a AAA
credit rating since the interest payments were backed by US Treasury securities, and another series of bonds
with a twenty-year guaranteed principal value at maturity and a lower credit rating reflecting the risk on the
remaining interest payments. If this second series could be rated investment grade, the final result would be to
transform high risk, impaired, syndicated loans of banks to Latin American governments into low riskinvestment grade bonds that could be sold to institutional investors, with a profit from the credit rating
differential as well as fees and commissions. This is called credit enhancement, and investment banks quickly
extended the Brady principle to other types of developing country debt. Since the first Brady issues were in
Mexico (JP Morgan had produced a prototype of the Brady Bond called the Aztec bond in 1988), this
extension also appears to have started in Mexico. 
The problem facing investment bankers was thus to find structures that allowed credit enhancement of these
issues at minimal cost. The first step in this process was the creation of an investment vehicle in the form of an
offshore trust that would buy high interest rate domestic bond (say a Mexican government issued security,
such as Cetes, which carries a AA domestic credit rating), along with some zero coupon US Treasury bonds.
These purchases would be financed through the issue of its own-dollar denominated bonds (no longer called
Brady's). The bonds could be divided into two classes, one class would have its principal collateralised by the
Treasury discount bonds in Brady fashion, while the other class, backed by the domestic bonds, would carry
no guarantee. The interest would be paid by the interest generated by the peso asset. For the rating agencies,
these were credit enhanced peso bonds, and they were assigned a credit rating equal to the Mexican
government rating on its peso issues in the domestic capital market. Since a government is always the
benchmark, and thus the domestic risk-free rate, it is almost by definition investment grade in its own market.
The enhanced bonds issued by the trust were thus given an investment grade rating. But, as dollar bonds
paying dollar interest rates they could be sold to US institutional investors. What the investor was in fact
buying was a peso denominated Mexican government bond, and the exchange rate risk on the interest
payments. But, on their balance sheets these were represented as if they were US investment grade bonds.
Again, the result was that US institutional investor funds were being invested in emerging market debt, earning
above market interest rates, without their balance sheets necessarily reflecting the actual risk involved. These
structures were offered in various combinations, but it still remains true that neither the investor nor the bank
intermediary have any direct interest in evaluating either the final use of the funds nor the risk adjusted returns.
For the intermediary there was no risk, unless the bank was required to guarantee that it could convert the
interest payments into dollars, which only represented a risk if the foreign currency were to become
inconvertible (this is not devaluation risk, but that it could not be traded at all). This provides one possible
explanation of why so much effort was made to prevent Mexico from suspending convertibility in 1994.
Structures similar to these were used in Asia as well as in Latin America. Thus the structured note and the
credit enhanced Brady structure provide simple examples of how funds were moved from developed to
developing countries despite the existence of prudential regulatory barriers, and why there was little effort
expended in insuring that the funds were moving to the highest risk adjusted uses. The buyers were interested
in enhancing yield in a low yield environment, while the intermediaries were interested in producing no risk, no
capital using vehicles that generated fee and commission income. Earnings on structured vehicles could exceed
2% of principal.
The result of these packages is to change the credit risk characteristics of the bonds by shifting them to
different individuals. They thus allow access for investors whose activities are limited by the credit risk
classification of they assets they can buy. "Emerging market borrowers use total return swaps to get access to
funding, or reduce the cost of it. The borrower sells assets to a bank and enters into a total return swap. In this
swap, he receives the total return on the assets sold and pays Libor plus spread. Consequently, the borrower
raises funds while at the same time still being able to benefit from a price appreciation of the asset sold."
"Investors use total return swaps to get access to their desired emerging market exposure. In a number of
countries, severe restrictions in the cash market prevail. For instance, cumbersome settlement procedures,
withholding taxes or minimum holding periods. Total return swaps can be an effective means for investors to
structure a way around these restrictions." (ibid., p.49). 
IV. Asset and Foreign Exchange Market Linkages
The linkage between foreign exchange markets and emerging asset markets is best seen through the example
of an extension of the structured vehicles discussed above. In an equity swap the emerging market owner of a
domestic asset exchanges the return from the asset (interest or dividend income plus change in capital value)
for a fixed term (or until maturity or perpetuity) against the zero interest loan (which may be in foreign
currency) of the current value of the asset. This is, of course, the equivalent of the sale of the asset, but without
the official transfer of ownership. Such a transaction avoids having to book a loss on the asset (an advantage toa bank in difficulty) or to book a tax event (an advantage of a rich businessman), while liquidating the value of
the asset. 
A variant of the equity swap is a total return swap in which the emerging market owner of a domestic asset
swaps the asset and its total return (again interest or dividend plus any change in capital value) for a dollar loan
equal to the value of the asset and a fixed dollar interest rate. Effectively a US bank is lending dollars against
the collateral of an emerging market asset, and the bank is paying the total return on the foreign asset against
receipt of a fixed dollar interest payment. Both the bank and the emerging market borrower are facing foreign
exchange risk, and the bank is accepting credit risk. For the emerging country borrower the advantage is that
the asset remains on the balance sheet and it gains funds at a cost below the domestic market without an entry
on the balance sheet and thus no additional capital requirement. It does increase the US bank's balance sheet as
it is lending dollar funds. Risk coverage would be arranged by buying the underlying asset, and then financing
the purchase through a repo with another bank, thus getting it off its own balance sheet. This hedges the US
bank's commitment to pay foreign currency denominated total returns on the asset. But exchange rate and
convertibility exposure on the amount of the loan advanced still remains. This could be hedged by issuing a
floating-rate note at a guaranteed above-market interest rate for the value of the principal and with a clause
permitting the payment of interest in foreign currency in the event of a suspension of currency convertibility.
The total return swap could be made against any underlying asset and also represents the effective sale of the
asset without a change in ownership. In effect, the US bank was buying foreign financial assets. While these
were primarily against Treasury paper held by bank counterparties, they could also be made against equity
positions, or the bank could use the proceeds to shift the allocation of its portfolio towards equity without
actually selling the Treasury securities and without having them appear on the balance sheet. 
This provides a possible explanation of a direct linkage between exchange rates and domestic asset markets. As
already mentioned, most of these instruments were set up on the presumption of stable exchange rates and any
indication that there might be a change in the way a central bank handled the exchange rate would create the
potential for substantial losses to investors. 
To see this, first consider the bank, paying total return on the foreign asset composed of interest plus change in
capital value. The fall in capital value will usually more than offset a rise in the rate of interest on the asset, so
that this value becomes negative. For the foreign owner of the asset, paying dollar interest on his loan, the
domestic currency costs of his dollar payments change by the amount of the devaluation in the domestic
currency. Since swap flows are calculated net, this means his carry cost on the position now represents the
higher foreign currency costs of his dollar interest, plus the loss in capital value of the underlying asset. A
position with a positive carry (i.e. a profit on the interest differential paid and received) is quickly reversed to a
negative carry and there is an incentive to unwind the swap by repaying the dollar loan. This creates an increase
in the demand for dollars in a market that is already showing massive excess dollar demand. However, if the
fall in the price of the underlying asset is large, or the devaluation is large, this may be impossible, and there is
default. 
Further, the natural response for the bank holding a total return swap, recognising the possibility of
counterparty default, would be to hedge its dollar exposure represented by the loan against the foreign asset.
This is accomplished by unwinding the hedge of its total return commitment, i.e. unwinding the repo of the
foreign asset, selling that asset in the foreign market and repatriating the proceeds at the best possible exchange
rate. On the other hand, the emerging market owner of the asset will have to repay the dollars borrowed against
the asset as collateral, so will seek to borrow domestic currency or sell the domestic assets financed with the
loan in order to buy dollars. The net result is that both parties to the swap will react by selling emerging market
financial assets and selling the domestic currency proceeds against dollars, providing levered downward
pressure on both asset market prices and the foreign exchange market. 
Most global investment banks were cognisant of risks that were created to exchange rate stability. Given this
type of exposure it is perhaps not surprising that the investment banks selling these products continued
publicly to express confidence in the prospects for exchange rate stability in countries to which they had large
outstanding exposures. Even if they had performed appropriate risk assessment, it would not have been in their
interests to inform market participants until they had succeed in unwinding their positions. It is thus also notsurprising that funds continued to flow to countries showing distinct risk of currency instability, for this is
what was required in order for structured positions to be closed without substantial loss.
Since most of these structured products are expressly designed to hide risk exposure by providing credit
enhancement, or by being classified off balance sheet, it is not surprising that bank regulators in emerging
economies had difficulty in discovering or controlling them. There is no reason why Asian regulators should
be any more efficient than US regulators who admit to difficulties in evaluating such instruments. Further,
Asian banks were being encouraged, just as US thrifts were encouraged in the 1980s, to deregulate, liberalise
and to attempt to grow their way out of difficulty by investing in higher return market assets. The regulators
accepted this strategy for resolution of the difficulties facing US institutions, it would be difficult not to accept
it if it were supported by both the government and the multilateral institutions.
V. Derivatives and Asian Capital Flows in the 1990s
Although direct reports of the role of derivatives in the Asian crisis are scarce, the majority of losses reported
by major US money center banks3 on their Asian lending were listed as swaps. Further, the suits that have
been filed by J.P Morgan and SK securities in their payments dispute, are reported to relate to total return
swaps.4 
It is also the case that the issue of capital market instruments by Asian borrowers surged in 1995 and 1996.
For example Asian issuance rose from $25.2 billion in 1995 to $43.1 billion in 1996. Not only were US
banks involved, much of the success of local investment banks, such as Hong Kong based Peregrine securities,
was primarily in underwriting and selling debt for Asian corporations. It could only do this if it could provide
reasonable guarantee for the placement for these issues. Given that its liquidation apparently placed a large
number of Asian corporates hedges in jeopardy because of failure of the counterparty suggests that Peregrine
might have been a major source of the high return Asian assets which served to form high return special
purpose vehicle for banks in Korea and investors in the developed countries. Korean securities houses and
investment banks were also apparently actively involved. The Korean Securities Supervisory Board reported
that they were operating over 100 offshore investment funds with portfolios valued at around $3 billion,
two-thirds of which represented Korean assets.5 
The law suits that have recently been filed by a number of Korean entities that were swap counterparties of JP
Morgan shed some light on the nature of these transactions. For example, in one transaction Morgan engaged
in a $/won currency swap with Boram Bank.6 
In a straight currency swap, the counterparties exchange principal and interest payments on the currencies, so
presumably Boram gave won to Morgan in exchange for dollars, and was paying Morgan a fixed interest rate
linked to the US dollar, while Morgan was paying a rate linked to won interest rates (the differential in the rates
when the swap was initiated in February 1997 were about 2 to 1), making a profit on the interest rate
differential. When the swap is unwound the principal sums are returned at a prearranged exchange rate, so that
Boram would have had to return dollars that were worth about three times as many won as at the beginning of
the swap. To cover this risk, Boram engaged in a series of swaps with SK securities. Presumably passing the
dollars on to SK securities which now carried the foreign exchange risks, but was borrowing at cheap dollar
interest rates, against won it was lending to its clients at call market rates. The exchange rate loss on the swap
was thus borne by SK, who owed this sum to Boram, who in turn owed it to Morgan. The Morgan suit places
the value at $189 million. Given the changes in exchange rates, the original principal could have been less than
$250 million.7 This is a relatively straightforward derivative transaction, but it gives an idea of the potential
losses involved, and why there was such pressure on the foreign exchange market to acquire funds to unwind
swaps of this nature.
The other transactions relate to swaps between Morgan and Korean offshore investment funds operated by SK
securities and Shinsegi Investment Trust.8 It is highly likely that these transactions involved equity swaps or
total return swaps. Thus bonds issued by Korean companies, underwritten by SK were placed in an offshore
special purpose vehicle, financed by the sale of investment shares to the Korean public or other financialinstitutions. The offshore trusts also invested in other Asian assets. These assets could then be used by the
offshore units to generate dollar loans equal to the value of the assets, plus won interest rate and capital
appreciation flows, against payment of dollar interest rates. These dollars could then be used to make further
loans to Korean companies, while the won payments received from Morgan would be used to pay the local
investors in the offshore vehicles. 
Again, the magnitude of the change in the exchange rate witnessed after the decision to float the won would
have produced capital losses on the assets and thus negative won inflows, which would have been transformed
into large dollar interest payments due to Morgan. The offshore trusts would have had to borrow to meet any
fixed interest payments, while the loss on the dollar borrowing would have decimated the capital value,
irrespective of changes in stock prices. The rush to hedge such exposure thus made the fall in the exchange
and asset markets that much worse. The legal cases at this stage simply involve failure of the trusts to meet
periodic payments on the swaps.9 It is reported that more than 40 of the over 100 such trusts had engaged in
similar swaps with Morgan.10 
Of its total of $3.4 billion of exposure to Korea, $2 billion are linked to derivative contracts. This perhaps
explains why Morgan was at the forefront of the move to convert Korean banks' short-term debt into sovereign
debt.
Another way of identifying the importance of derivatives activity in the area is with reference to the Country
Exposure Lending Survey for money centre banks published by the FFIEC which reports figures for total
amounts lent by country of borrower, net of derivatives, and the cross border exposure resulting from
revaluation gains on foreign exchange and derivative products after adjustments for guarantees and external
borrowings.


















Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Country Exposure Lending Survey/1, Table 1, p.
18-9, April 8, 1998.
Since derivatives exposure only results when a counterparty default places the bank under a risk of having to
replace the instrument at a loss to current market conditions, the figures in the second column represent profits
for US money centre banks on their derivatives activity. In Thailand, these profits far exceed the total amounts
owed for traditional lending. For Korea they are well over half the figure of total lending. In Indonesia they are
roughly two-thirds. Thus, in all three countries that have had to apply for IMF support, derivatives sold by US
banks played a non-negligible role in financing activities.11 While these figures do not allow a calculation of
the actual amount of funds that were channeled to Asia via structured derivative products, they do support the
view that they played an integral part in the rise in short-term flows to the region.
Clearly, as the crisis unfolds we shall learn more of the role of derivatives in facilitating the flow of short-term
funds to the Asian economies. This note is not meant to argue that all of the difficulties surrounding capitalflows to Asia were caused by derivative instruments, but simply to point out that their existence does little to
support the common belief in the self-regulating nature of private capital markets in terms of risk assessment
or of their ability to allocate capital efficiently. Financial innovation and free capital movements, on the other
hand, do provide means by which financial intermediaries can increase the rate of return on their capital by
increasing the rate of flow and increasing the risks born by their counterparties. 
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Notes   
1. This frequently cited study is as yet unavailable. The summary that appears in the World Economic Outlook
(Part II, Box 1, 1998) suggests that hedge funds mainly attack countries whose "macroeconomic variables are
far out of line with sustainable values". Another recent study (Brown, Goetzmann and Park, 1998) suggeststhat hedge funds did not take major positions against Asian currencies or financial assets and did not make
abnormal returns during the last half of 1997. From this one might conclude that the hedge fund managers did
not detect any unsustainable policies in these countries..   
2. For example, Chew (1996, p. 57) observes that "Structured notes are the epitome of how investment
technology helped and continues to help money managers circumvent guidelines that were framed to protect
the interest of small, unsophisticated investors ..."   
3. It is clear that German and French banks were also heavily involved in derivatives trading in the region.
Andrews, Edmund L.( "Huge German Bank Covering Risks in Asia," New York Times, January 29, 1998)
reports that Deutsche Bank set aside $777 million (double its loss provisions for 1996) to cover losses of as
much as $100 million on derivatives trading in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Société
Générale is reported to have set aside $164 million, against a total exposure of $6.8 billion (the $4 billion lent
in Korea is primarily lending to Korean companies, cf. Lavin). Commerz has $3 billion in loans (37% of
equity), Dresdner 26% of equity and Deutsche, 27% of equity in Asian loans..   
4. Cf. Korea Times, 16 February, 1998: "SK Securities, JP Morgan Heading for Int'l Court Battle Over
Derivatives" which refers to an offshore investment fund created by LG Metal and SK Hannam Investment
Securities Fund: "The $18 million fund was called 'Diamond Fund', and was guaranteed by Boram Bank" "JP
Morgan had entered into a swap transaction with Boram in February 1997, involving an exchange of dollars
for the Korean currency." (The fund lost an estimated $120 million). "Such derivatives as total return swap
were popular a year ago as they allowed investors to borrow yen at low interest rates and invest in
higher-yielding currencies such as the Thai bat (sic) or Indonesian rupiah."
  
5. Korea Times, "Brokerage, Trust Firms Incur 1.5 Tril. Won Losses From Offshore Funds" February 19,
1998. The Korean "Securities Supervisory Board said that brokerage houses have more than a 10 percent stake
in 66 funds. Another 23 funds were invested in by parent offshore funds of securities firms." "The offshore
funds were reported to have invested 68.3 percent of their money in Korean securities". The Board also reports
that the losses that SK securities companies and investment trust companies suffered in offshore funds are
estimated at 1.5 trillion won (KRW)($1 = krw 1,672) as of the end of last year. "Four investment trust
companies are running 19 offshore funds, which were reported to have suffered about 400 billion won." See
AP-DJ News Service, February 20, 1998 "S.Korea Banks Sec Cos From Making Offshore Fund Guarantees" 
  
6. "Boram had agreed to a trade of two revenue streams, giving Morgan the stream linked to the prevailing US
interest rate in return for the revenue from a basket of derivatives linked to the value of Southeast Asian
securities and the Thai baht" ... "A year ago, investment bankers eagerly pitched derivatives to SK companies.
With benchmark Japanese rates at 0.5 percent, it made sense to sign contracts that would allow investors to
borrow in yen and invest in higher-yielding Asian currencies, many of which were linked to the dollar until last
year. "It's not an accident that a lot of derivatives got sold in Korea," said John Ellis, head of the Asia
derivatives debt at Bank of America in Honk Kong, "It was as good as lending money." See "Review &
Outlook": Busting Contracts, Wall Street Journal , February 23, 1998.
  
7. Although Boram was prepared to pay Morgan, SK brought suit in a Korean court to block the payment, thus
hoping to exonerate it from having to pay Boram the funds which would have ended up being paid to Morgan.
  
8. One of the 30 recently created investment banks created, it was suspended by the Korean Government at the
beginning of December and closed at the end of the year. In September it was listed as having 66 billion won
in equity, 3,125 billion won in total outstanding loans, 3.66% of which were classified.   9. Again, the legal cases are peripheral to these considerations. Housing and Commercial Bank (a government
owned bank ranked 24th in N. Asia with over $1billion in equity in 1996 at 1996 exchange rates) apparently
offered credit enhancement by offering to guarantee the foreign exchange payments of the offshore trusts.
Morgan has brought suit against the bank (and SK securities) for failing to make payments missed by the
offshore trusts). Housing and Commercial however contends that their exposure was limited to a maximum of
$50 million for each swap, and is therefore not responsible for the total losses of the trusts. O'Brien (1997, p.
D2) suggests that the original maximum was $100 million but that the contract was changed without the
knowledge of the bank to unlimited exposure. Morgan contends that as officer of the bank authorised removal
of the limiting clause before closure of the contract. According to O'Brien's account "SK and M had a close
working arrangement. SK had established offshore funds to manage the derivatives, and those funds also
purchased other securities directly from Morgan".
SK was also sued as parent of the trusts. The total value of the suit is $300 million.   
10. "there are about 40 other local funds that operated in similar agreements with J.P. Morgan, ...J.P. Morgan
has a total exposure of $3.4 billion to Korea, of which $2 billion is to derivatives products." See Cecilia Kang,
"Korea Housing/J.P. Morgan -3: Calls Inaction Inappropriate"(AP-DJ News Service, February 18, 1998).
  
11. The Bank of Korea reported (AP-Dow, March 5, 1998) that trading in financial derivatives by South
Korean banks increased by 60.1% in 1997 to $556.5 billion. Foreign exchange forwards conprise about
two-thirds of the total. It also reported that Korea's 26 banks booked losses for 1997 of 3.92 trillion won, while
the 39 branches of foreign banks reported net profits of 930.48 billion won (Indutrial & Commercial Bank of
China and Credit Suisse First Boston were the only foreign banks reporting losses) (Park, 1998). 